We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962) . Informally speaking, robustness requires that a matching must be stable in the classic sense, even if the agents slightly change their preferences. Near stability, on the other hand, imposes that a matching must become stable (again, in the classic sense) provided the agents are willing to adjust their preferences a bit. Both of our concepts are quantitative; together they provide means for a fine-grained analysis of the stability of matchings. Moreover, our concepts allow the exploration of trade-offs between stability and other criteria of social optimality, such as the egalitarian cost and the number of unmatched agents. We investigate the computational complexity of finding matchings that implement certain predefined trade-offs. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that, given agent preferences, returns a socially optimal robust matching, and we prove that finding a socially optimal and nearly stable matching is computationally hard.
INTRODUCTION
In the Stable Marriage problem [14] we are given two disjoint sets of agents, U and W . Each agent from one set has a strict preference list that ranks a subset of the agents from the other set. The sets of agents and their preference lists are collectively called preference profile. The goal is to find a matching-i.e., a bijection between U and W -that does not contain a blocking pair, i.e., a pair of agents who prefer each other over their matched partners. A matching with no blocking pairs is called a stable matching.
The classic definition of stability is qualitative: A matching can be either stable or not, and there are no other states in between or beyond. In this paper, by contrast, we take a quantitative approach. We propose and study two solution concepts: robustness and near stability, where the former strengthens and the latter relaxes the notion of stability. Intuitively, a robust matching is more than stable; it remains stable even if agents change their preferences slightly. In contrast, a nearly stable matching needs not be stable for the original profile, but it becomes so after some minor changes in the preferences. Below we give more precise definitions of robust and nearly stable matchings and motivate their study through a number of observations. Robust matchings. Our first main observation is that the preference lists provided by the agents do not always reflect their true preferences. This can happen, for instance, because the agents do not have full information about their potential partners, or because formulating accurate preferences is a hard task that requires substantial cognitive effort. It is also typical that the agents change their preferences over time, for instance, in response to changes in their operating environment. Thus, a matching that is stable in the classic sense (with respect to the preferences expressed by the agents at the beginning) can in fact contain two or more agents who already have or will likely have incentives to drop their assigned partners and be matched with each other. In other words, there are situations where the classic definition of stability can turn out to be too weak. In a different setting, a third party may want to destabilize a matching by bribing certain agents to change their preferences. In that case, we are interested in stable matchings which defy such attacks.
For the above reasons, we introduce and study d-robustness, a strengthened notion of stability. A matching is d-robust for a given preference profile if this matching is stable and remains stable after performing an arbitrary sequence of d swaps. Here, a swap is the reversal of two consecutive agents in a preference list. Intuitively, if a matching is d-robust for some reasonably large d, then it will not become unstable even if the agents specified slightly inaccurate preferences, nor will it become unstable even if the agents change their preferences by a little. Example 1.1 below illustrates the concept of robustness. In terms of robustness, M 2 is superior to M 1 since M 2 is 1-robust but M 1 is not. To see that M 2 is 1-robust we observe that, to make M 2 unstable, we need to perform one swap in the preference list of an agent in W . However, no such single swap will make M 2 unstable. Stable matching M 1 is not 1-robust since one can swap in the preference list of any agent u from U the two agents M 1 (u) and w in the first and the second positions to obtain a profile where {u, w } is a blocking pair for M 1 . ⋄ Nearly stable matchings. Our second main observation is that there exist other factors, apart from the preferences, that can discourage the agents to break their relations with their matched partners. Such factors may include social pressure and additional costs incurred by changing the partner, for example. Thus, in some situations even weaker forms of stability may guarantee a sufficient level of resilience to agents changing their minds. We express this as the local d-near stability of a matching, which stipulates that there is a sequence of swaps such that the matching becomes stable, and in each agent's preference list, at most d swaps are made.
This concept has an intuitive interpretation similar to the ϵ-Nash-equilibrium [29, Section 2.6.6] in game theory: In a locally d-nearly stable matching no agent can improve its satisfaction by more than d through rematching (see also the equivalent definitions in Proposition 2.7). This is analogous to ϵ-Nash-equilibria, where no agent can improve their outcome by more than ϵ. In this sense, local near stability also measures the strength of the incentive for two agents in a blocking pair to change their partners. 1 Our third main observation is that, when there are constraints on other factors of the matching like social welfare (see below), it may not be possible to find a stable matching satisfying these constraints. Thus, it may be necessary to balance between the social welfare and the costs incurred by agents that want to switch partners. This cost is captured by the global d-near stability of a matching M, stating that there is a sequence of at most d swaps in total such that M becomes stable. In order to achieve the desired social welfare, we may thus provide proportionate compensation to the agents affected by the swaps.
Taking nearly stable matchings into consideration may indeed allow us to find a matching that is significantly better from the perspective of the society as a whole, than if we restricted ourselves to stable matchings only. This is illustrated in the following example: Example 1.2. Let U = {a 0 , . . . , a n−1 , x 1 , . . . , x n } and W = {b 0 , . . . , b n−1 , y 1 , . . . , y n }, and consider the following preference profile P of the agents; the index "i + 1" is taken modulo n.
. . , n}). In every stable matching of P agent x i must be matched with y i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and a 0 with b 0 . Consequently, a 1 needs to be matched with with b 1 and, by an inductive argument, we can infer that, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, a i must be matched with b i . Thus, if we look at the agents from B = {b 1 , . . . , b n }, we observe that, except for b 0 , each of them is matched with a partner ranked at the (n + 2)th position. Yet, if we consider the profile obtained from P by swapping a 0 and a n−1 in the preference list of b 0 , then
be a stable matching. In this matching everyone is matched to one of her two most preferred agents. ⋄ Intuitively, Example 1.2 shows that with a relatively small loss of stability, one can significantly improve the social cost of a matching M-in this example, this cost is defined as the sum of ranks that an agent a has in the preference list of its matched partner M(a). In the literature this measure is often referred to as the egalitarian cost of a matching [19] . We also consider another metric that counts the number of agents that are assigned a partner in a matching. Recall that we assume that the preference rankings of the agents are incomplete: the agents do not rank those from the opposite set that they would not agree to be matched to. In such a case a stable matching does not need to be perfect, i.e., it is possible that some agents will not be matched at all. The effect of stability on the number of matched agents is illustrated in Example 1.3. Example 1.3. Consider a profile with 2 men, a 1 and a 2 , and 2 women, b 1 and b 2 , with preference lists:
For this profile, the only stable matching is {{a 2 , b 1 }}. However, if we swapped b 1 and b 2 in the preference list of a 2 , then {{a 1 , b 1 }, {a 2 , b 2 }} would be a stable matching, i.e., we would obtain a stable matching where more agents have partners. ⋄ Examples 1.2 and 1.3 suggest that there is a (possibly non-linear) trade-off between stability and other criteria of social optimality. Our definition of near stability provides a formalism necessary to describe the trade-offs; yet, in order to take advantage of them, one needs to be able to identify situations where a large improvement of social welfare is possible with a relatively small sacrifice of stability. We formalize this question as a computational problem (see Section 2.1 for formal definitions) and study its complexity.
Our contributions. We introduce the concepts of robustness and near stability, and explore the trade-off between stability and the egalitarian cost and between stability and the number of matched agents. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a preference profile and a number d, finds a matching which is d-robust if it exists (Theorem 3.14). We achieve this by providing a polynomial-size characterization of the profiles (Section 3.2) which are close to the input profile and by heavily exploiting the structural properties of so-called rotations adherent to a preference profile [17] . Moreover, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a d-robust matching with minimum egalitarian cost if one exists (Theorem 3.16). However, when ties are present, we show that finding a robust matching is NP-hard (Theorem 4.1).
In contrast to the polynomial-time algorithms for robust matchings, we show that the problem of finding a matching that implements a certain trade-off between the near stability and the egalitarian cost, or between the near stability and the perfectness of the matching is NP-hard, and it is NP-hard to approximate (Theorem 5.1). Motivated by this general hardness result, we study the parameterized complexity, mainly with respect to the parameter number of allowed swaps (for details on parameterized complexity we refer to the books of Cygan et al. [10] , Downey and Fellows [11] , Flum and Grohe [13] , and Niedermeier [28] ). See Table 1 for a summary. Unfortunately, we mostly obtain further hardness results. While for local near stability even only one allowed swap leaves the problem NP-hard (Theorem 5.1), for global near stability there is a polynomial-time algorithm for each constant number d G of allowed swaps (Proposition 5.2). The exponent in the running time depends on d G , however, and this dependency cannot be removed unless the unlikely complexity-theoretic collapse FPT = W[1] happens (Theorem 5.3). We also study the complexity in the cases where there are small numbers of unmatched or matched agents in a classically stable matching of the input profile. Proofs for results marked by ⋆ appear in a full version [9] .
Related work. For an overview on the Stable Marriage and related problems, we refer to the books of Knuth [21] , Gusfield and Irving [17] , and Manlove [25] .
One of the observations that motivates our study of robust matchings is that the preferences of the agents may be uncertain. In this regard, Aziz et al. [2] , Miyazaki and Okamoto [27] , and Chen et al. [8] study a variant of Stable Marriage where there is a collection of "possible" preference profiles given as input, and they look for a matching that is stable in each of the given profiles (the corresponding computational problem is NP-hard even for constant number of input profiles). Our work starts with the assumption that the preferences provided by the agents are a good approximation of their true preferences. Thus, our robustness concept respects every profile that is close to the preferences provided by the agents. This makes a crucial difference-finding a robust matching if one exists, according to our definition, is solvable in polynomial time. Table 1 . Summary of our results, where d denotes the number of swaps for robust matchings, d L (resp. d G ) denotes the number of swaps for global near stability (resp. local near stability), η denotes the egalitarian cost of the desired matching, and n u denotes the number of unmatched agents in any stable matching of the initial profile without ties. Our robustness concept is related to the works of Mai and Vazirani [22, 23] . They introduced a probabilistic model, where there are polynomially many preference profiles given in the input, each differing from the original one by a single agent's preference list; the goal is to find a stable matching that stays stable with the highest probability. In contrast, in our definition of robustness, we require that the sought matching must be stable in every profile which is close to the original one, but which can differ from the original profile in preference lists by more than one agent. Our algorithmic techniques can be considered as a generalization of the ones by Mai and Vazirani [22] . Now we turn to work that is more related to our near stability concept. Another interpretation of a locally d-nearly stable matching is that in each blocking pair there is an agent whose rank improvement by switching partners would be at most d. Drummond and Boutilier [12] use this rank improvement approach to study Stable Marriage problem under partially ordered preferences. They introduced the notion of an r -maximally stable matching, i.e., a matching such that for each linear completion of the input profile and for each unmatched pair at least one agent in the pair ranks the other higher than its matched partner by at most r positions. When restricting the input to linear preferences, as is our focus here, r -maximal stability is equivalent to local r-near stability for each r ≥ 0. We prove this formally in Proposition 2.7. Here, in contrast, we do not deal with partial preferences, but instead we want to achieve a given social welfare in addition to r -maximal stability.
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Pini et al. [30] and Anshelevich et al. [1] studied a concept called (additive) α-stability that measures the degree of instability for utility-based preferences. For ordinal preferences, their concept is equivalent to our local α-near stability. Anshelevich et al. [1] studied the trade-off between the total utility of a matching and its α-stability for restricted structures of utility scores (which cannot model ordinal preferences). Pini et al. [30] showed that a certain kind of lexicographically optimal α-stable matching can be found in polynomial time and they considered manipulation issues.
Finally, we review further related work, not necessarily directly related to our notions of robustness or near stability. Recently, Menon and Larson [26] proposed a different robustness concept to deal with uncertain preferences-the authors assume that each agent has preferences with ties, and they look for a perfect matching so as to minimize the maximum number of blocking pairs among all linear extensions of the input preferences. Finding a solution as above is equivalent to finding a perfect matching with minimum number of so-called super-blocking pairs, a concept introduced by Irving [18] to cope with preferences with ties. Genc et al. [15, 16] provide yet another view on robustness in the context of stable matchings. They define an (x, y)-supermatch as a stable matching that satisfies the following property: If any x agents break up, it is possible to rematch these x agents so that the new matching is again stable; further, this re-matching must be done by breaking at most y other pairs. Hence, an (x, y)-supermatch may not be robust in our sense, but it needs to be easy to repair. In the second part of this paper we study trade-offs between the stability , Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: May 2019.
(of various strength) and other criteria of optimality such as the egalitarian cost and the number of unmatched agents. This is related to the studies on the price of stability in matching markets [4] .
BASIC DEFINITIONS, NOTATIONS, AND OUR STABILITY CONCEPTS
For each natural number t by [t] we denote the set {1, 2, . . . , t }. Let U = {u 1 , . . . , u n } and W = {w 1 , . . . , w n } be two n-element disjoint sets of agents. A preference profile P = ((≻ P u ) u ∈U , (≻ P w ) w ∈W ) is a collection of the preference lists of the agents from U and W . Here, for each agent u ∈ U , the notation ≻ P u denotes a linear order on a subset W ′ of W that represents the ranking of agent u over all agents from W ′ in profile P. The agents in W ′ are also called acceptable to u. The candidates not ranked by u are those in W \ W ′ , that is, those that u does not agree to be matched to; we also call them unacceptable. If w ≻ P u w ′ then we say that w is preferred to w ′ by u in P. Analogously, for each agent w ∈ W , ≻ w represents a linear order on (a subset of) U that represents the ranking of w in profile P and we likewise use the notions of preference list, preferred, (un-)acceptable, and (not) ranked. We say that P has complete preferences if each agent finds all agents from the opposite set acceptable.
Given an agent x with her preference list ≻ x and given an agent y from the opposite set, the rank rk x (y, ≻ x ) of y in the preference list of x is equal to the number of agents that are preferred to y by x. If y is not acceptable to x then we let rk x (y, ≻ x ) be equal to the number of agents acceptable to x. We usually omit the symbol ≻ x in rk x (y, ≻ x ) and write only rk x (y) whenever the preference list of x is clear from the context. For instance, the rank of y 3 in the preference list ≻ x : y 1 ≻ y 3 ≻ y 2 is one. We say that x ranks y higher than z, if rk x (y) < rk x (z).
Throughout, except in Section 4, by "x ⪰ y" for two agents x and y we mean "x = y or x ≻ y". Given two disjoint sets of agents, U and W , a matching M is a set of pairwise disjoint pairs, each pair containing one agent from U and one agent from W , i.e. M ⊆ {{u, w } | u ∈ U ∧ w ∈ W } and for each two pairs p, p ′ ∈ M it holds that p ∩ p ′ = ∅. Given a pair {u, w } with u ∈ U and w ∈ W , if it holds that {u, w } ∈ M, then we use M(u) to refer to w and M(w) to refer to u, and we say that u and w are their respective partners under M; otherwise we say that {u, w } is an unmatched pair. We say that {u, w } is blocking (or a blocking pair of ) M if both u and w would prefer to be matched together than to stay with their current partners. Formally, {u, w } is a blocking pair if the following holds: (1) u and w find each other acceptable but are not matched together, (2) u is either unmatched by M or rk u (w) < rk u (M(u)), and (3) w is either unmatched by M or rk w (u) < rk w (M(w)). We say that a matching M is stable if no unmatched pair forms a blocking pair for M. Example 1.1 in the introduction illustrates stable matchings.
We use SM(P) to denote the set of all stable matchings for a preference profile P. Given a matching M, we use BP(P, M) to denote the set of all unmatched pairs that are blocking M in profile P. Obviously, for each stable matching M ∈ SM(P), it holds that BP(P, M) = ∅.
Our Spectrum of Stability Notions and Problems
Let us now define our concepts of robustness and near stability, informally introduced in Section 1.
First of all, we need the notion of swaps, which describes the operation of taking two consecutive agents x and y in a preference list of a third agent z and switching their relative order in order to obtain a new preference list. We also use (z, {x, y}) to denote such a swap. Given two preference lists ≻ and ≻ ′ , the swap distance (also known as the Kendall τ distance [20] ) between ≻ and ≻ ′ is defined as the number of differently ordered pairs in the two lists; if the two lists are defined on two different acceptable sets, then the swap distance is infinity. Intuitively, the swap distance is equal to the minimum number of swaps that are required to turn ≻ into ≻ ′ . Accordingly, the swap distance between two preference profiles P 1 and P 2 , denoted as τ (P 1 , P 2 ), is defined as the sum of swap distances between the two preference lists of each agent in profiles P 1 and P 2 . EC'19 Session 1a: Theory of Matching Markets Definition 2.1 (Robustness). For a given preference profile P, we say that a matching M is d-robust if for each profile P ′ with τ (P, P ′ ) ≤ d it holds that M is stable in P ′ .
Note that our robustness concept is monotone-each d-robust matching is also d ′ -robust for 0 ≤ d ′ ≤ d. We are interested in the computational question of finding the maximal integer d such that there is a d-robust matching. This can be phrased as a decision problem as follows:
Robust Matching
Input: A preference profile P with agent sets U and W of size n each, and an integer d ∈ N. Question: Is there a d-robust matching for P?
Now, we define near stability. Here, we provide two definitions-global near stability and local near stability-that differ in the scope of admissible changes to the original preference profile. Definition 2.2 (Near stability). For a given preference profile P, we say that a matching M is
Since near stability is a more permissive concept than stability as defined by Gale and Shapley [14] , it is straight-forward that a globally d-nearly stable (or locally d-nearly stable) matching always exists for d ≥ 0. Here, our main focus is to explore the trade-offs between the strength of stability and other criteria of social optimality. We say that a matching M is perfect if each agent has a partner in M.
. This leads to the following computational problems, abbreviated as Global-Near+Egal, and Local-Near+Egal.
Globally (or Locally) Nearly Stable Egalitarian Matching
Input: A preference profile P with agent sets U and W of size n each, and two integers d, η ∈ N. Question: Is there a globally d-nearly stable (or locally d-nearly stable) stable matching for P which has egalitarian cost at most η in P?
Globally Nearly Stable Perfect Matching (Local-Near+Perf) and Locally Nearly Stable Perfect Matching (Local-Near+Perf) are defined similarly, with the only differences that the input will not contain the egalitarian cost η and we ask for a nearly stable perfect matching.
For preferences without ties (i.e. every agent has a strict preference list), we will use the following fundamental result from the literature. . For incomplete preferences without ties, the agent set can be partitioned into two disjoint subsets R and S such that every stable matching matches every agent from R and none of the agents from S. For agent set of size 2n, this partition can be computed in O(n 2 ) time.
Structural Properties of Robust and Nearly Stable Matchings
Before we proceed further, we provide some structural results concerning Definitions 2.1 and 2.2. First we give two observations regarding robustness. These are not necessary for the considerations about algorithms later on, but serve to strengthen the intuition about profiles that allow for robust matchings and, we feel, are interesting in their own right. Further below, we consider the trade-off between near stability and perfectness of matchings and give alternative characterizations of locally nearly stable matchings. Proposition 2.4 (⋆). If d ≥ n and there exists one agent who finds at least two other agents acceptable, then no stable matching is d-robust. 
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A matching is top-choice if each agent is matched to her most preferred partner. A profile is position-wise distinct if there are no two agents that have the same agent in the same position in their preference lists. Proposition 2.5 (⋆). Every (n − 1)-robust matching is top-choice and every profile allowing for an (n − 1)-robust matching is position-wise distinct. Now we discuss the trade-offs formalized in the problems regarding near stability and social optimality. As mentioned in Example 1.2 even a single swap in the preference profile can improve the egalitarian cost of the stable matching by Ω(n 2 ). However, this is not the case when the social optimality is measured by the number of agents who will have a partner in the matching. Theorem 2.6 (⋆). Let P 1 and P 2 be two preference profiles with τ (P 1 , P 2 ) = 1. Let S 1 and S 2 denote the set of agents that are unmatched by any stable matching of P 1 and of P 2 respectively. Then,
Repeated application of Theorem 2.6 yields that, in order to increase the number of matched agents by ℓ ∈ N in a given stable matching of some profile we have to allow for at least ℓ/2 swaps. In other words, if a stable matching leaves s agents unmatched, then there is a globally d-nearly stable perfect matching only if d ≥ s/2.
Let us recall the notion of r -maximal stability for the case with linear orders [12] : 
A POLYNOMIAL-TIME ALGORITHM FOR FINDING ROBUST MATCHINGS
In this section we present a polynomial-time algorithm for the Robust Matching problem. First, in Section 3.1 we provide a brief overview of tools and results from the literature that we will use in our algorithm. We remark that all these results are originally stated for complete preferences. Nevertheless, since all stable matchings match the same set of agents (Proposition 2.3), we can verify that they also hold when the preferences may be incomplete. The results described in the subsequent sections, starting from Section 3.2, are our original contributions.
Preliminaries
As already observed in the literature, the set of all stable matchings for a given preference profile forms a lattice-a specific partially ordered set-that is useful in designing algorithms for finding special kinds of stable matchings. The maximum and minimum elements are so-called optimal stable matchings: Consider a preference profile P with two sets, U and W , of agents and consider two matchings M and M ′ . We say that an agent a ∈ U ∪ W prefers M to M ′ , denoted as M ≻ a M ′ , if rk a (M(a)) < rk a (M ′ (a)). Accordingly, we say that M is a U -optimal (resp. W -optimal) stable matching if it is stable and there is no other stable matching M ′ different from M such that each agent from U prefers M ′ to M. It is well-known that U -optimal and W -optimal stable matchings are unique. The concepts of U -optimal and W -optimal stable matchings are already illustrated in Example 1.1. 
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We now review a fundamental object, rotations, and some well-known structural properties of stable matchings. These concepts will play an instrumental role in our analysis in the subsequent sections. For more details, we refer to the exposition by Gusfield and Irving [17] . Definition 3.1 (Successor agent, rotations, and rotation elimination). Let P be a preference profile with two disjoint sets of agents, U and W , and with (possibly) incomplete preferences. Given a stable matching M ∈ SM(P), for each agent u ∈ U , we define its successor succ M (u) as the first (after M(u)) agent w on the preference list of u such that w is matched under M and prefers u to its partner M(w). A sequence ρ = ((u 0 , w 0 ), (u 1 , w 1 ), . . . , (u r −1 , w r −1 )) of pairs is called a rotation if there exists a stable matching M ∈ SM(P) such that for each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r − 1} we have (u i , w i ) ∈ U ×W , M(u i ) = w i , and succ M (u i ) = w i+1 (index i + 1 taken modulo r ). We say rotation ρ is exposed in M.
We use the notation M/ρ to refer to the matching resulting from M by replacing each pair
Eliminating a rotation from a stable matching results in another stable matching [17] . The concepts from Definition 3.1 are illustrated in the example below. 
is the only rotation exposed in M 1 . ⋄ Interestingly, while a given profile with O(n) agents may admit exponentially (O(n!)) many different stable matchings, the number of rotations is polynomial (O(n 2 )) [17, Corollary 3.2.1]. Indeed, the set of all rotations gives a compact representation of the set of all possible stable matchings for a given preference profile. Now we are ready to introduce the notion of the rotation poset of a given preference profile P. As we will see later on, each stable matching can be obtained by performing a number of eliminations of rotations on the U -optimal stable matching. When starting from U some rotations can be exposed only after some other have been already eliminated. This induces a partial order on rotations and defines the rotation poset.
Definition 3.3 (Predecessors of rotations, the rotation poset, and the rotation digraph).
Let π and ρ be two rotations for a preference profile P. We say that π is a predecessor of ρ, written as π ▷ P ρ, if no stable matching in which ρ is exposed can be obtained from the U -optimal stable matching by a sequence of eliminations of rotations without eliminating π first. The reflexive closure of the relation ▷ P , denoted as ⊵ P , defines a partial order on the set of all rotations and is called the rotation poset for P. We abbreviate the name of a subset of the poset that is closed under predecessors as a closed subset.
An alternative representation of the rotation poset ⊵(P) is through an acyclic directed graph, called rotation digraph of P and written as G(P), whose vertex set is the set of rotations of P, and there is a direct arc from rotation π to rotation ρ if and only if π precedes ρ and there is no other rotation σ such that π ▷ P σ ▷ P ρ. 
Profile Characterization
For a given profile P with O(n) agents and a given swap distance bound d = O(n) there are exponentially many profiles which are within swap distance d to P. In this section, we show that we do not need to consider all of them in order to find a d-robust matching. Instead, we characterize them based on pairs of shifts. Briefly put, a shift is a set of swaps which all involve swapping the same agent forward in a single preference list. We describe a polynomial-size family of "relevant" profiles and we characterize each of them through a pair of shifts-such a pair of shifts will be represented by a quadruple of agents. Intuitively, if there exists a profile P ′ witnessing that a certain matching M is not d-robust, and if P ′ contains more than two shifts with respect to the original profile P , then P ′ can be represented by a number of profiles which satisfy the following. Each of these profiles contains only two shifts and one of them witnesses that M is not d-robust. Later on, we will show that the quadruples which characterize the profiles relevant for checking d-robustness are closely related to certain rotations-this will give us the tools essential for constructing a polynomial-time algorithm. Definition 3.5 (Stable qadruples and swap sets). Let P = ((≻ P u ) u ∈U , (≻ P w ) w ∈W ) be a preference profile for the two agent sets U and W . A stable quadruple (with respect to P) is a quadruple (u * , w * , u, w) of four distinct agents with u * , u ∈ U and w * , w ∈ W such that there exists a stable matching for P that contains both {u * , w } and {u, w * }.
For each stable quadruple q = (u * , w * , u, w) of P, we define the swap set associated with P and q, denoted as SH (P, q), as the smallest set of swaps which involve the following two kinds of shifts in the preference lists of u * and w * . (1) The first kind of shifts puts agent w * forward until she is right in front of w in the preference list of u * , and (2) the second kind of shifts puts agent u * forward until she is right in front of u in the preference list of w * . If w * (resp. u * ) is already in front of w (resp. u), then no swap in the corresponding preference list is needed. Formally, SH (P, q)
x })}. Herein, the notation x ⪰ y means either x = y or x ≻ y. Further, let shl(≻ P u * , q) denote the preference list resulting from starting with ≻ P u * and performing the swaps from SH (P, q) that involve the preference list of u * . Analogously, let shl(≻ P w * , q) denote the preference list resulting from starting with ≻ P w * and performing the swaps from SH (P, q) that involve the preference list ≻ P w * . Now, let P[SH (P, q)] denote the preference profile resulting from P by replacing the preference lists of u * and w * with shl(≻ P u * , q) and shl(≻ P w * , q), respectively. Formally, P[SH (P, q)] ((≻ P x ) x ∈U \{u * } + shl(≻ P u * , q), (≻ P y ) y ∈W \{w * } + shl(≻ w * , q)). Example 3.6. For an illustration, let us consider the profile given in Example 1.1, denoted as P = ((≻ P u i ) u i ∈U , (≻ P w i ) w i ∈W ), and the following stable quadruple q = (u 3 , w 2 , u 4 , w 1 ); note that {u 3 , w 1 } and {u 4 , w 2 } are in the stable matching M 3 . The swap set SH (P, q) consists of two swaps; both involve changing u 3 's preference list:
By performing the swaps given in SH (P, q) on ≻ P u 3 and on the preference profile, we obtain that
). Finally, we observe that in P[SH (P, q)], u 4 prefers w 1 to w 2 and w 1 prefers u 4 to u 3 . ⋄ A stable quadruple q and the corresponding profile P[SH (P, q)] satisfy the following properties. Observation 3.7. Let P be a preference profile over the two agent sets U and W , let q be a stable quadruple with q = (u * , w * , u, w) and let Q = P[SH (P, q)] denote the preference profile after performing the swaps in the set SH (P, q). 
In P[SH (P, q)], agent u * prefers w * to w, and agent w * prefers u * to u.
Informally, we will argue that, to find a robust matching, it suffices to focus on profiles obtained by performing swaps induced by certain quadruples. Further, we will show that for each quadruple q = (u * , w * , u, w) in profile P[SH (P, q)] we only need to make sure that {u * , w * } is not a blocking pair.
Finally, the following lemma summarizes the informal intuition that we provided so far-it shows that when searching for a d-robust matching, we only need to focus on some relevant profiles which are close to the initial one. 
Relation Between Stable Quadruples and Rotations
Before we state our central results, we need one more element: In this subsection we define two specific rotations corresponding to a stable quadruple and we investigate their properties pertaining to robustness. The results stated in this subsection might look quite technical, yet we deliberately chose these particular formulations as we believe they make the analysis of our algorithm transparent. Definition 3.9 (π (q) and ρ(q) for a stable qadruple q). Consider a preference profile P 0 = (≻ P 0
x ) x ∈U ∪W with two sets of agents, U and W , and consider a stable quadruple q = (u * , w * , u, w). We use the notation π (q) to refer to a rotation π ((u ′ 0 , w ′ 0 ), . . . , (u ′ r −1 , w ′ r −1 )) with u * = u ′ i (for some i ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}) that fulfills the following conditions. (i) If w * ≻ P 0 u * w, then w * = w ′ i or w ′ i ≻ P 0 u * w * ≻ P 0 u * w ′ i+1 ; (ii) Otherwise, meaning that w ≻ P 0 u * w * , then w = w ′ i+1 . We use the notation ρ(q) to refer to a rotation ρ ((u ′ 0 , w ′ 0 ), . . . , (u ′ r −1 , w ′ r −1 )) with w * = w ′ i (for some i ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}) that fulfills the following conditions. (i) If u * ≻ P 0 w * u, then u * = u ′ i−1 or u ′ i−1 ≻ P 0 w * u * ≻ P 0 w * u ′ i ; (ii) Otherwise, meaning that u ≻ P 0 w * u * , then u = u ′ i . Rotations π (q) and ρ(q) can be informally described as follows. Consider the preference profile Q = P[SH (P 0 , q)]. Rotation π (q) is the first rotation (according to the precedence relation on rotations) that moves the partner of u * from w * or from an agent who is more preferred than w * to an agent that is less preferred than w * , where the preference relation is according to profile Q. Similarly, rotation ρ(q) is the first rotation that moves the partner of w * from an agent who is less preferred than u * to u * or to an agent that is more preferred than u * , where the preference relation is according to profile Q. However, in Definition 3.9 we deliberately do not refer to profile Q and define the rotations π (q) and ρ(q) solely based on P 0 in order to make the subsequent formal analysis and the algorithm as clear as possible.
Roughly speaking, eliminating rotation π (q) could make a stable matching of the original profile not stable anymore in the new profile Q-indeed, this is the "first" rotation, elimination of which causes u * to prefer w * over its matched partner. In order to make sure that {u * , w * } is not blocking the constructed matching in Q, we need to enforce that, whenever the matching includes π (q), agent w * must obtain a partner who she prefers over u * . This is achieved by also including ρ(q) to the matching. In other words, when selecting rotations which should form a robust matching, adding ρ(q) fixes some potential issues that arise as a result of adding π (q) to the matching. This intuition is formalized in the subsequent lemmas and theorems. While the main idea is intuitive, the formal analysis is complex since we need to take care of a few technical nuances. 
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Note that, by our definition, neither π (q) nor ρ(q) needs to exist. However, if they exist, then they are unique. We will prove this statement in Lemma 3.11, below. The following example that illustrates the definitions of π (q) and ρ(q).
Example 3.10. Consider the profile given in Example 1.1 again. Let q = (u 3 , w 2 , u 4 , w 1 ) be the stable quadruple discussed in Example 3.6. Then, π (q) = π 1 and ρ(q) = π 3 . The full version [9] contains a derivation of this fact. ⋄ Rotations π (q) and ρ(q) are critical concepts that will be used by our algorithm for finding robust matchings. The next two lemmas provide tools which allow us to use these concepts conveniently. We start by showing that π (q) and ρ(q) are unique. Lemma 3.11 (⋆). Let q = (u * , w * , u, w) be a stable quadruple of a preference profile P. The following holds. (1) If π (q) exists, then it is unique. (2) If ρ(q) exists, then it is unique.
The following result is a centerpiece of the algorithm, specifying exactly which constraints need to be fulfilled by a closed subset of rotations which corresponds to a robust matching. Lemma 3.12 (⋆). Let P 0 be a profile and q = (u * , w * , u, w) be a stable quadruple of P 0 . Let Q = P[SH (P 0 , q)] denote the profile after we perform the swaps in SH (P 0 , q) on P 0 . The following holds.
(i) Assume that π (q) does not exist. If w * ≻ P 0 u * w, then each stable matching N ∈ SM(P 0 ) has w * ≻ 
Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Robust Matchings
We now first present an O(n 4 )-time algorithm for finding a robust matching if it exists. Then we use a Linear Programming (LP) formulation to show that perfect robust matchings and robust matchings with minimum egalitarian cost can be found in polynomial time if they exist. Both approaches crucially rely on (a) the one-to-one correspondence between the stable matchings and the closed subsets of the rotation poset [17, Chapter 3.7], (b) the implications between the presence of the two rotations π (q) and ρ(q) of stable quadruples q derived in Lemma 3.12, and (c) the fact that all stable quadruples can be computed in O(n 4 ) time. The proof for (c) is roughly by iterating over all possible rotations and building a lookup table that stores for all pairs (x, y) ∈ U × W of agents a constant number of rotations that make the partner of x less preferred to y or more preferred to y. For given stable quadruple q, rotations π (q) and ρ(q) can then be looked up in the table. We state this observation for reference below.
Proposition 3.13 (⋆). Determining all stable quadruples q and their respective rotations π (q) and ρ(q) as defined in Definition 3.9 can be done in O(n 4 ) time.
We now prove our main result for the Robust Matching problem. 
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Proof. Our approach is described in Algorithm 1. Let P be the profile in the given instance. To obtain an O(n 4 ) algorithm we work with the rotation digraph G(P) (see Definition 3.3 and Proposition 3.4). Call a vertex subset S in a directed graph G closed, if there is no arc in G pointing outwards from S. Recall that a stable matching for P corresponds to a closed subset of the rotations in the rotation poset, i.e., a closed vertex subset S of G(P). Intuitively, Algorithm 1 first adds arcs to G(P) in lines 2 to 6 that model implications between rotations contained in d-robust matchings given in Lemma 3.12. Then, it removes rotations from G(P) that cannot occur in d-robust matchings according to Lemma 3.12 in lines 7 and 8. Finally, it checks in line 11 whether there is a closed subset of rotations which contains the required rotations for d-robust matchings according to Lemma 3.12. We now prove the correctness; the running time analysis appears in the full version [9] . Input: A preference profile P with agent sets U and W , and an integer d ∈ N. Output: A d-robust matching for P or ⊥ if none exists. 1 Compute the rotation digraph G(P) 2 G 1 (P) ← G(P) 3 foreach stable quadruple q with |SH (P, q)| ≤ d do 4 Compute π (q) and ρ(q) if they exist using Prop. 3.13 5 if π (q) and ρ(q) then return ⊥ 6 if ∃π (q) and ∃ρ(q) then G 1 (P) ←G 1 (P)+(ρ(q), π (q)) exist and ρ(q) exists and, furthermore, ρ(q) ∈ V (G 1 (P)) \ V (G 2 (P)). Let S be the closed subset of rotations in G(P) associated with M. By Lemma 3.12 (iv), ρ(q) ∈ S. Since ρ(q) V (G 2 (P)), by lines 7 and 8, there is a stable quadruple q ′ with |SH (P, q ′ )| ≤ d such that π (q ′ ) ∈ D and there is a path (possibly of length zero) from π (q ′ ) to ρ(q) in G 1 (P). Since ρ(q) ∈ S, thus also π (q ′ ) ∈ S. P admits three rotations, π 1 = ((u 1 , w 2 ), (u 2 , w 3 ), (u 3 , w 1 ), (u 4 , w 1 )), π 2 = ((u 1 , w 3 ), (u 3 , w 1 )), and π 3 = ((u 2 , w 4 ), (u 4 , w 2 )). There are ten stable quadruples for d = 1. The corresponding π (q) and ρ(q) are summarized in the lower left table.
Stable quadruple q with |SH (P, q)| ≤ 1 π (q) ρ(q)
The digraphs G(P) and G 1 (P) = G 2 (P) constructed in Algorithm 1 are depicted in the lower right figure.
One can verify that A = {π 1 } (see rows 4, 8, 9 in the  table) . T = {π 1 , π 2 , π 3 } is the only closed set in G 2 that includes π 1 , which corresponds to M 2 . Indeed our algorithm will return M 2 (see Example 1.1) as the only 1-robust matching. ⋄ Now we turn to the problem variants where we look for a perfect d-robust matching or one with minimum egalitarian cost. Our polynomial-time algorithm for these variants builds on a Linear Programming (LP) formulation which finds a stable matching. This LP formulation in turn is based on the one-to-one correspondence between the stable matchings and the closed subsets of the rotation poset [17, Chapter 3.7] . A crucial property of this formulation is that its constraint matrix is totally unimodular. Hence, each extreme point of the polytope defined by this formulation is integral.
The LP formulation is as follows. Let P 0 be a preference profile with two disjoint sets, U and W , each containing n agents. Let R(P) be the set of rotations for P 0 and let G(P 0 ) with arc set E(P 0 ) be the rotation digraph of P 0 regarding the precedence relation ▷ P 0 ; by Proposition 3.4(ii), both the rotation set R(P 0 ) and the rotation digraph G(P 0 ) can be computed in O(n 2 ) time. For each rotation ρ ∈ R(P 0 ), we introduce a variable x ρ with box constraints 0 ≤ x ρ ≤ 1, where x ρ = 1 will correspond to adding ρ to the solution subset while x ρ = 0 means that ρ will not be taken into the subset. By Gusfield and Irving [17, Chapter 3.7] , the constraint matrix of the constraints
is totally unimodular and thus there is a solution in which each variable takes either value zero or one. In this way, the set S = {ρ | x ρ = 1}, defined by including exactly those rotations whose variable values are set to one is closed under the rotation poset and thus defines a stable matching.
Theorem 3.16. Finding a d-robust perfect matching and finding a d-robust matching with minimum egalitarian cost, if they exist, can both be done in polynomial time.
Proof. Following Lemma 3.12, we will add some additional constraints to the LP given by (LP1) and (LP2), which results in an LP whose constraint matrix remains totally unimodular (see [6] 
To determine whether there is a d-robust matching for our instance, we need to consider every possible profile that differs from the original profile by at most d swaps. For 2n agents, there are, however, (2n) O (d) such profiles. To avoid this, we characterize these profiles by stable quadruples, using Lemma 3.8. To achieve this, we compute for each stable quadruple q with |SH (P 0 , q)| ≤ d the two specific rotations π (q) and ρ(q) as defined in Definition 3.9.
As already discussed, π (q) and ρ(q) may not exist. If they exist, then by Lemma 3.11 they are unique. Moreover, by Lemma 3.12(iii), we may assume that at least one of π (q) and ρ(q) exist as otherwise SM(P) ∩ SM(P[SH (P, q)]) = ∅, implying that P does not admit a d-robust matching. We distinguish between three cases, in each case describing how to add some constraints to the LP defined above.
Case (1): Both π (q) and ρ(q) exist. Add the constraint x π (q) − x ρ(q) ≤ 0.
(LP3.1) By Lemma 3.12, statements (v), (vi), and (vii), the stable matching defined according to a closed subset is stable in P[SH (P 0 , q)] if and only if x ρ(q) = 1 or x π (q) = 0.
Case (2): π (q) exists but ρ(q) does not. Add the constraint x π (q) = 0 (LP3.2)
The above constraint is justified by Lemma 3.12(vii).
Case (3): π (q) does not exist but ρ(q) exists. Add the constraint
This constraint is justified by Lemma 3.12, statements (iv) and (v). Note that in each of the three cases, we add to the constraint matrix a row which has at most one +1, at most one −1 and the remaining values are all 0s. Thus, we can infer by Camion [6] that the resulting constraint matrix is still totally unimodular and all primal solutions to our problem are integral. Since the matrix has O(n 4 ) rows and O(n 2 ) columns, solving the thus constructed LP can be done in polynomial time.
Since all stable matchings match the same set of agents (Proposition 2.3), it is apparent from the above LP that finding a d-robust and perfect matching if it exists can be done in polynomial time. Finding a d-robust matching, if one exists, with minimum egalitarian cost can also be done in polynomial time by the following: For each rotation ρ we can compute how adding ρ to a stable matching changes its egalitarian score. Then, it is sufficient to add an appropriate optimization objective to the LP constructed above. □
ROBUSTNESS AND PREFERENCES WITH TIES: NP-HARDNESS
When the input preferences may contain ties, we consider a swap to be a pair of two agents that belong to two neighboring tied classes. Finding a stable matching can be done in O(n 2 ) time even when ties are present [18] . In contrast, presence of ties makes Robust Matching NP-hard:
Theorem 4.1 (⋆). Robust Matching with ties is NP-hard even when the number d of swaps allowed is one.
NEARLY STABLE MATCHINGS
We now present our results on the complexity of finding nearly stable matchings which are perfect or within a given egalitarian cost bound. We start in Section 5.1 by observing that all four problems variants of near stability are NP-hard. Indeed, we provide a stronger result, which says that under the standard complexity theory assumption P NP the minimization variants of all considered problems do not admit a polynomial-time polynomial-factor approximation algorithm. In Section 5.2 we study the influence of the number of allowed swaps on the complexity of the problem variants. 
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Classical and Approximation Hardness
To show hardness, we will focus on the so-called gap variants of our problems, and prove that these gap variants are NP-hard. These gap problems can be solved by the corresponding approximation algorithms so that their NP-hardness will rule out polynomial-time approximation algorithms for our problem. Loosely speaking, an α-gap variant of some minimization problem Q has, as input, a specific instance I of Q and a cost upper bound q ∈ N and asks whether (1) I admits a solution of cost at most q, or (2) each solution for I has cost at least α ·q (without requirement on the answer when the optimum solution is in the "gap" interval (q, α ·q)). Note that, to decide between these two options we can use a factor-α approximation algorithm (if it exists), an algorithm that is guaranteed to find a solution of cost at most α ·opt where opt is the minimum cost. Hence, if the α-gap problem is NP-hard, a polynomial-time factor-α approximation algorithm implies P = NP. Proof. The NP-hardness will follow from the inapproximability results by setting the corresponding approximation factors to 1. Thus, we only need to show the inapproximability results, which are based on the same basic construction. We only give the details of the construction. In the full version [9] , we prove that, on the instances resulting from the construction, approximability of Global-Near+Perf, Global-Near+Egal, Local-Near+Perf, or Local-Near+Egal implies polynomial-time solvability of all NP-complete problems.
Let poly 1 , poly 2 : N → N be two arbitrary polynomials. We will show non-existence of any polynomial-time and poly-approximation algorithm, using a reduction which introduces a gap in the near stability between an optimally nearly stable solution and any other nearly stable solution.
We reduce from Independent Set, which has, as input, an undirected graph G with vertex set V (G) and edge set E(G) and a positive integer k ∈ N, and asks whether G contains an independent set of size k, i.e. a k-vertex subset of V ′ ⊆ V (G) of pairwise non-adjacent vertices. Let I = (G, k) be an instance of Independent Set. Let V (G) = {v 1 , . . . , v n } and E(G) = {e 1 , . . . , e m } denote the set of vertices and the set of edges in G, respectively. We interpret the edges as two-element subsets of V (G). For each vertex v i ∈ V , by E(v i ) we denote the set of edges incident with vertex v i in G.
From G we will construct a preference profile P. The lower thresholds for the gap problems we are constructing are as follows. We define threshold for the number of swaps for a globally nearly stable matching as d G m + n, the threshold for the number of swaps per agent of a locally nearly stable matching as d L 1, and the threshold for the egalitarian cost of a globally d G -nearly stable matching as η k + (poly 1 (d G )·d G + poly 1 (d L )·d L + 2) · (3m + (2n + k) · k + (2n − k) · (n − k)). For ease of notation, let d * G poly 1 (d G )·d G + poly 1 (d L )·d L + 1, and η * poly 2 (η) · η + 2.
Construction. We construct a profile P as follows. We introduce the following disjoint sets of agents: V ,T , E, F (men);W , S, R, E V (women); and two disjoint sets A∪B and C∪D of auxiliary agents. Sets V and W will represent the vertices of G, sets R, S, and T will force a selection of k vertices, and sets E, E V , and F will ensure that the selected vertices are pairwise nonadjacent. The auxiliary agents from A ∪ B enforce that only swaps of some specific agents are relevant while the auxiliary agents from C ∪ D require that each matching within some appropriate egalitarian cost must be perfect.
The non-auxiliary agents. Specifically, the non-auxiliary sets contain the following agents: A substantial improvement on the above rather trivial n O (d G ) -time algorithm would imply a major breakthrough, as the following theorem shows. By Proposition 2.3, the set of unmatched agents is the same across all stable matchings of a given preference profile P. We call an agent initially unmatched if she is not contained in any stable matching of the initial profile; otherwise she is initially matched. From Theorem 2.6 it follows that, in order to assign partners to the n u initially unmatched agents, we need to allow for at least d G ≥ n u /2 swaps in Global-Near+Perf. The number n u is thus a smaller parameter than d G , meaning that it could be harder to obtain parameterized tractability result with respect to n u than to d G . Indeed, we obtain intractability for n u . On a side note, it is not hard to obtain a fixed-parameter algorithm for Global-Near+Perf with respect to the number n m of initially matched agents, that is, the number of agents that occur in every stable matching of the initial profile. We conclude this section by remarking that the kernelization approach for Proposition 5.5 cannot be directly adapted to work for the egalitarian case because not every initially unmatched agent needs to be matched in an optimal egalitarian stable matching.
CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
We conclude with some challenges for future research. First of all, for the case where no d-robust matchings exist, we may look for a matching that admits the fewest number of blocking pairs [3, 7] in every profile that has swap distance d to the input profile.
Second, continuing our research in Section 4 where we showed that Robust Matching becomes NP-hard when ties are allowed, our near stability concept can be generalized to the case with ties. Moreover, both robustness and near stability, though introduced for the bipartite variant (Stable Marriage), can be generalized to the non-bipartite variant (Stable Roommates). It would be interesting to see whether our algorithmic results transfer to these cases.
Regarding preference restrictions [5] , it would be interesting to know whether assuming a special preference structure can help in finding tractable cases for nearly stable matchings. 
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